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ABSTRACT  
This research aims to examine the influence of firm size, board size, and ownership 
structure on risk management disclosure on syariah banking in Indonesia 2011-2014. 
This research uses secondary data which is the annual report of syariah banking. The 
sample was selected by purposive sampling which are 10 syariah banking qualified in 
this research. This research conducts multiple linear regression analysis method to 
examine the hypothesis in the level of significance 5%. The result of this research 
showed that firm size, board size and public ownership have influence on risk 
management disclosure. Meanwhile, the institutional ownership didn’t have a 
significant impact on risk management disclosure. 
Keywords:  Firm size, board size, institutional ownership, public 
ownership, risk management disclosure. 
1. BACKGROUND 
The sharia banking industry is becoming a promising industry. This is 
indicated by persistence of Bank Muamalat in condition of economic crisis of 
Indonesia in 1998, whereas on the other hand some conventional banks 
actually fall.  Starting from here, finally came Bank Syariah Mandiri as the 
second sharia bank in Indonesia. Who would have thought that Bank Syariah 
Mandiri turned out to be quite successful and became the encouragement of 
the emergence of various other Islamic banks in Indonesia 
(https://www.cermati.com). In addition, according to the Indonesian Banking 
Development Institute, sharia banking is able to produce an average growth 
of 34% per year.  
The growing world of industry today, including the sharia banking 
industry, requires businesses to provide more open financial information. 
Many parties need the financial information for decision making, so that clear 
and credible financial information is very important role. 
Disclosure implies that openness is the basis of public confidence in 
management within the corporate system. Many researchers have pointed out 
that one of the factors that worsened Indonesia's condition during the 1997 
crisis was the lack of corporate governance. It is characterized by a lack of 
transparency in corporate management (Saputro, 2014). 
Transparency is needed in risk-laden businesses. Risks arise tend to be 
uncertain, but these uncertainties will have an impact on the future in the 
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process of achieving goals. At first the risk is seen as negative, whereas now 
risk is viewed both positively and negatively in response to a number of 
events. Because there are various perceptions of risk, a business actor needs 
further information on risk disclosure to make decisions and invest in the 
company (Aditya, 2015). 
In line with the urgency of risk management disclosure, large 
corporations should provide a more open report to the public. The reason is, 
the greater the company the more things that should be reported in order to 
provide clear information for the parties concerned. However, this has not 
always been fulfilled. Even some big companies actually dragged the case of 
transparency. For example the case of Bank Syariah Mandiri due to the lack 
of transparency that ever happened in 2009 as reported by hukumonline.com. 
This case began when Bank Syariah Mandiri submitted a proposal to offer 
financing cooperation Mudharabah Muqayyadah to Dapenda, December 
2003. In the proposed bid mentioned, the financing will be disbursed to PT 
Sari Indo Prima as the cost of developing a sack-making business. Six 
months ago, Dapenda did not get a profit-sharing ratio because Sari Indo 
Prima and Bank Syariah Mandiri did not pay the installment, either the 
principal obligation or the margin (difference) of profit sharing. Since the 
beginning of the financing process, Dapenda considers Bank Syariah Mandiri 
not transparent. This is reflected, among others, from the previous financing 
of Sari Indo Prima amounting to Rp 6.5 billion in October 2003, before the 
contract was made. Meanwhile, in the financing agreement number 108 
mentioned that Sari Indo Prima is not in a state of debt to the other party. 
Regarding the phenomenon, Lecturer of Economics of University of 
Indonesia, Ratna Wardhani, asserted, the company should have provided 
transparent information that is easily accessible. Company policy should be 
written and distributed to interested parties. "Because it is not transparent, 
finally there is a gap between parties who have access to strong information 
with parties who access information is weak," he said (http://ekbis.rmol.co).
 In addition, the supervisory function undertaken by the board of 
commissioners has an important role in the operation of a company. 
According to Ali Suyanto, a board member of a BPR financial institution, 
argued that in the case he had met and rather strangely thought, there was an 
BPR obliging its board of commissioners to work every working day with 
working hours like other operational employees. As a result the board of 
commissioners are involved (too) active in every transaction in the BPR. But 
there was also a BPR commissioner who says that the board of 
commissioners need not be involved in banking operations (BPR). On the 
one hand, Ali approves the statement because the board of commissioners is 
a non-operational officer. But on the other hand, in the case or limitations of 
certain large authorities, the board of commissioners must also be involved 
accompanying the authority of the board of directors. For example in the case 
of the authority to delete a bad credit book in the BPR. If such authority is 
100% given to the board of directors without limitation of amount and 
without requesting approval to the board of commissioners first, it would be 
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very uncontrollable of that authority. In management there is always a 
supervisory function. Every function within the organizational structure must 
be supervised (www.kompasiana.com). 
Besides, in a company there is another important role that is the role 
of independent commissioners. Independent commissioners become the main 
organ for the implementation of good corporate governance practices, by 
looking at the functions they have. Therefore, in accordance with the name of 
an independent commissioner, it must have independence, have the 
professionalism and leadership that is the basic thing required of its role. 
However, for companies in Indonesia, there is a bias in the exercise of 
independence by independent commissioners due to some trends such as the 
position of strong directors or the competence and integrity of weak 
independent commissioners (http://www.kompasiana.com).  
Not only that, a company's capital structure also plays its role in 
supporting risk management disclosure. If a company is financed with a 
substantial amount of debt it is necessary to clearly disclose the related debt 
management in conducting the business of the company, so that any risks that 
arise can be identified. The Company based its funding decision on the 
optimal capital structure. The optimal capital structure is formed by 
balancing the benefits of tax savings on the use of debt against bankruptcy 
costs. The use of debt leads to an increase in EBIT that flows to investors, so 
the greater the debt of the company, the higher the value and the stock price 
of the company (http://kikimariki.blogspot.co.id). However, some companies 
actually stumble because of this debt problem. According to 
https://m.tempo.co, PT Prima Inreksa Industrian declared bankruptcy by the 
Central Jakarta Commercial Court on May 31, 2011 and with the decision 
Numb. 04 / PKPU / 2911 / PNiaga / Jakpus due to debt until the company is 
unable to continue production. Meanwhile, other factors that determine 
risk management disclosure are public ownership (Prayoga, 2013 and 
Saputro, 2014). Publicly owned shares need to be clearly disclosed in terms 
of any risks that may arise. In Indonesia, the majority of big companies that 
dominate the economy are controlled by the family. It was found that about 
80% of public companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) are 
controlled by the family. The problem that might arise is the management 
entrenchment problem, that is, the family survives too long in top 
management so it is difficult to be deposed even though no longer competent. 
The placement of less competent family members in the management 
(nepotism) also potentially hampers the company's performance. This 
condition make minority shareholders in family-based public companies 
become helpless (http://konfrontasi.com). 
Other than publicly owned shares, institutional ownership also 
contributes to investment. According to President Director of BEI Ito 
Warsito, quoted by www.cnnindonesia.com, "At the end of March 2015, the 
percentage of institutional investors' stock ownership in IDX is still quite 
dominant at 73.14 percent. Thus, transaction activity of institutional investors 
has become one of the benchmarks for retail investors in transactions. "In 
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addition, changes in institutional ownership behavior from passive to active 
can increase managerial accountability so managers will act more carefully in 
decision making. Increased institutional ownership activity in monitoring is 
due to the fact that significant share ownership by institutional ownership has 
increased their ability to act collectively (http://www.kesimpulan.com). This 
will certainly give a good impact. However, the active attitude of this 
institutional ownership can also make other impacts that are less good. For 
example, as reported by www.britama.com, the stock price of Three Pillar 
Sejahtera Food Tbk (AISA) recorded down about 9.69% due to the release of 
large institutional investors. It is rumored that the institution is releasing 
AISA shares after hearing news related to its subsidiary Golden Plantation 
Tbk (GOLL) in the middle of liquidity difficulties. 
Meanwhile, several previous studies mentioned that firm size has a 
significant effect on risk management disclosure (Kristiono, 2014). This is in 
line with research conducted by Rahman (2013), which states "There is a 
significant positive relationship between the bank size and the extent of risk 
management disclosure". Meanwhile, Wardhana's (2013) study also 
reinforces that firm size has a significant influence on risk disclosure. 
However, these three studies contradict the results of research conducted by 
Prayoga (2013) and Saputro (2014) that company size has no effect on risk 
management disclosure. 
In addition, according to research Suhardjanto (2012), the size of the 
board of commissioners affect the level of risk disclosure. This research is 
also supported by research conducted by Aditya (2015) that the size of the 
board of commissioners has a significant positive effect on the extent of 
corporate risk disclosure. 
Besides, the results of research conducted by Kusumaningrum (2013), 
found that institutional ownership affects the disclosure of risk management. 
However, the research conducted by Kristiono (2014) shows different results: 
institutional ownership has no significant effect on risk management 
disclosure. This is in contrast to Aditya's (2015) study, which states that 
institutional share ownership has a significant positive effect on the extent of 
corporate risk disclosure. While research of Saputro (2014) support previous 
research conducted by Prayoga (2013) that public ownership positively 
influence to risk management disclosure. 
In some previous studies, the results obtained show different 
conclusions. In addition, no one has used a sample of Sharia Commercial 
Banks in risk disclosure research in Indonesia. Based on the research gap, 
this study is intended to examine what factors affect the disclosure of risk 
management, therefore this study raises the issue of "Influence of Company 
Size, Board of Commissioner Size, and Ownership Structure on Risk 
Management Disclosure". 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
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2.1 AGENCY THEORY 
The agency theory can be defined as the relationship between agent or 
management of a business and principal or shareholder (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976 in Aditya, 2015). Meanwhile, according to Suranta (2003) in 
Saputro (2014) states that agency relationship is a contract whereby one or 
more principals hire another person (agent) to perform some services for their 
benefit by delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. 
This theory states that between shareholders and management have 
different interests. One of the differences between shareholders and 
management is that shareholders want to maximize their profits, while the 
decisions made by managers to maximize their own satisfaction turn out not 
to prosper the shareholders, then the agency conflict occurs. Another agency 
conflict is too much management knowing the true information about the 
problems caused by the company compared with the shareholders, resulting 
in information asymmetry, where there is a difference between information 
acquisition between management as information providers and shareholders 
as users of information (Aditya, 2015). 
According to Kristiono (2014), agency theory can be used as a basis 
for understanding in risk disclosure practices. Managers as agents, have more 
detail and more accurate company information, than stakeholders. Such 
information covers all conditions of the company, including conditions that 
may be faced by the company in the future. Shareholders, creditors, and other 
stakeholders need such information to base their decision-making. If there is 
information asymmetry between agents and principals, then the decisions 
taken can be bad and harm the various parties. The manager should ensure 
the availability of relevant and complete information about the risks facing 
the company, one of which is by using a disclosure mechanism. In 
conclusion, good risk disclosure reduces the asymmetry of information 
between agents and principals. 
Meanwhile, agency issues, in turn, incur agency costs. At the most 
common level, agency costs are the dollar equivalent of the welfare decline 
experienced by the principal due to differences from shareholders and agency 
interests. Jensen and Meckeling divide the agency into three, there are : 
monitoring costs, bond costs, and residual losses (Godfrey, 2010). 
According to Godfrey (2010), the cost of monitoring is the cost of 
monitoring agency behavior. Monitoring costs are issued by shareholders to 
measure, observe and control agent behavior. Examples of monitoring costs 
are audit fees, the cost of establishing a management compensation plan, 
budget constraints, operating rules. Similarly, under a debt contract, the 
manager (currently acting on behalf of the shareholder) is the lending agent. 
The greater the risk of lending, the lenders will prefer to monitor the 
performance of their companies in investing by providing debt. If there is an 
efficient price protection, the agent can ultimately bear the monitoring costs 
associated with the contract. Therefore, agents tend to establish mechanisms 
to ensure they will behave in the interests of shareholders, or to ensure they 
will compensate shareholders if they act in a manner that is against the 
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interests of shareholders. Agents will be ready to issue bond costs only to 
reduce the cost of monitoring that they bear. 
Despite the costs of monitoring and bonds, it still shows that the 
interests of agents remain unlikely to match the interests of shareholders. 
Furthermore, the agent will likely make some decisions that are not entirely 
for the benefit of shareholders. For example, managers may change accounts 
to maximize their bonuses. Thus, the net value of the agent's output is 
reduced rather than if the agent's interests are completely aligned with the 
principal's interests (Godfrey, 2010). 
2.2 SIGNALLING THEORY 
According to T. C. Melewar (2008), signal theory suggests that firms will 
signal through action and communication. The company adopted these 
signals to reveal hidden attributes for the stakeholders. Another definition of 
Godfrey, at. Al (2010), states that the signal theory speaks of managers who 
use accounts in financial statements to signal the expectations and future 
goals of the company. While Scott Besley and Eugene F. Brigham (2008), 
the signal is an action taken by the management of the firm that gives 
instructions to investors about how management views the prospects of the 
company. 
Signal theory suggests how companies should signals to users of 
financial statements. This theory explains why firms have an incentive to 
provide financial statement information to external parties. The impulse 
arises because there is information asymmetry between the company and 
external parties. Companies / managers have more knowledge about the 
company's condition than external parties (Wolk, et al, 2001 in Prayoga 
2013). 
According Jogiyanto (2000), information published as an 
announcement will provide a signal for investors in making investment 
decisions. When information is announced and all market participants have 
received the information, market participants first interpret and analyze the 
information as a good signal or bad signal. If the announcement of such 
information as a good signal for investors, then there is a change in the 
volume of stock trading. 
One type of information issued by the company that can be a signal 
for parties outside the company, especially for the investor is an annual 
report. Information disclosed in the annual report can be accounting 
information that is information relating to financial statements and non-
accounting information is information that is not related to the financial 
statements. Annual reports should contain relevant information and disclose 
information that is considered important to both in-house and outsider 
reporting users. All investors need information to evaluate the relative risk of 
each company so that it can diversify its portfolio and investment 
combination with desired risk preferences. If a company wants its shares 
bought by an investor then the company must disclose financial statements 
openly and transparently (Jogiyanto, 2000). 
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2.3 RISK MANAGEMENT DISCLOSURE 
2.3.1 Risk 
Risk is a variation of the results that can occur during a certain period (Arthur 
Williams and Richard M.H). Another definition of risk according to A. Abas 
Salim is uncertainty that may result in loss or loss events. Risk can also be 
interpreted as a probability combination of an event with consequences or 
consequences (Siahaan, 2007). Meanwhile, according to Soekarto, risk is 
uncertainty over the occurrence of an event. Meanwhile, according to 
Herman Dermawan, risk is the probability of something different from the 
expected results. From some of these definitions can be concluded that the 
risk is always associated with the possibility of occurrence of something 
unexpected or undesirable (Tony, 2011). 
2.3.2 Risk Management 
According to the Australian Risk Management Standard (4360: 2004), risk 
management is a culture, process, and structure directed towards realizing 
potential opportunities and at the same time managing adverse impacts. 
While the other definition states that risk management is a set of policies, 
complete procedures, which the organization has, to manage, monitor, and 
control the organization's exposure to risk (SBC Warburg, The Practice of 
Risk Management, Euromoney Book, 2004). Risk management in other 
words is a method of formal systematic handling that is concentrated on 
identifying and controlling events or events that have the possibility of 
undesirable changes (Tony, 2011).  
2.3.3 Risk Management Disclosure 
Risk management disclosure can be interpreted as disclosure of risks that the 
company has managed or disclosure of how the company controls the 
associated risks in the future (Amran et al, 2009 in Saputro, 2014). Another 
definition expressed by Kristiono (2014), states that the disclosure of risk is a 
company's attempt to notify users of the annual report on what threatens the 
company, so it can be a factor in decision-making considerations. 
Risk disclosure is important because it helps stakeholders in obtaining 
the information necessary to understand the risk profile and how to manage 
risk management. Risk disclosure is also useful for monitoring risk and 
detecting potential problems so that it can take early action to prevent the 
problem happen (Linsley and Shrives, 2006 in Suhardjanto, 2014). 
There are several regulations on disclosures that have been applied in 
Indonesia, one of them is the provision of risk disclosure. Risk disclosure is 
set forth in the Financial Services Authority Regulation Numb. 18 / POJK.03 
/ 2016 on: the implementation of risk management for Commercial Banks. 
While the provisions on information disclosure are set out in PSAK Numb. 
60 (revised 2010) on financial instruments: presentation and disclosure 
(Aditya, 2015). 
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Disclosure of risk management based on Amran et al. (2009) and 
Wardhana (2013) covers financial risk, operation risk, empowerment risk, 
information processing and technology risk, integrity risk and risk strategy. 
Definitions of each of these risks: 
1. Financial risk, risks related to interest risk, exchange risk, commodity, 
liquidity, and credit. 
2.  Operation risk, risks related to customer satisfaction, products 
development, efficiency and performance, sourcing, stock obsolescene 
and shringkage, product and service failure, environment, health and 
safety, and brand name erosion. 
3.  Empowerment risk, risks related to leadership and management, 
outsourcing, performance incentives, change readiness, and 
communications. 
4.  Information processing and technolody risk, risks related to integrity, 
access, availability, and infrastructure. 
5.  Integrity risk, risks related to risk-management policy, management and 
employee fraud, illegal acts, and reputation. 
6.  Strategic risk, risks related to environmental scan, industry, business 
portofolio, competitors, pricing, valuation, planning, life cycle, 
performance measurement, regulatory, and sovereign and political. 
2.4 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.4.1 Firm size affects risk management disclosure 
Large companies can provide reports for internal purposes as well as meet the 
needs of external parties. The bigger the company, the more information it 
will disclose, the more detailed the things that will be disclosed such as 
information about the company's risk management, because large companies 
are considered capable of providing such information.  
Almilia (2007) in Kristiono (2014), mentioned that large companies 
may disclose risk management information in an effort to reduce agency 
costs. Large companies have the ability to hire skilled employees, as well as 
shareholder demands and analysis, so that large companies have an incentive 
to engage in a wider disclosure of small firms. Large companies are entities 
that are heavily highlighted by both the market and the public in general. 
Revealing more information about risk management is part of the company's 
efforts to realize public accountability. 
H1 : Firm size affects risk management disclosure  
2.4.2 Board size affects risk management disclosure 
The size of the board of commissioners or board size indicates that it will be 
more effective in supervising if the size is larger, so management and 
shareholders can supervise each other and avoid the emergence of 
information asymmetry. This is in line with the agency theory used as the 
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basis in this study. Information asymmetry arises because of differences in 
information owned by the principal (shareholders) and agents (management 
of the company). Management of the company as a party that comes down 
directly in managing the company certainly more information about the 
condition of the company. Therefore, in the presence of adequate number of 
board of commissioners is expected to maximize the supervisory function in 
avoiding the occurrence of information asymmetry. Thus, if the supervisory 
function of the board of commissioners runs maximal then the disclosure of 
company information including the disclosure of risk management can be 
better. 
According to Dalton et al (1999) in Aditya (2015), the board of 
commissioners of optimum size is easier to control the CEO and is 
increasingly effective in monitoring management activities rather than small 
size boards of commissioners. The size of the board of commissioners 
becomes a benchmark of the maximum supervisory functions including in 
overseeing the disclosure of company information in the form of risks that 
exist due to the operational activities of the company. 
H2 : The board size affects risk management disclosure 
2.4.3 Institutional ownership affects the disclosure of risk management 
Institutional ownership is the ownership of shares owned by institutions or 
institutions of domestic and foreign banks. Institutional ownership here acts 
as an investor who has a duty to oversee the running of the company by 
management. Investor control measures by the investor will reduce 
opportunistic or self-serving behavior, so management will maximize its 
performance, including in this case related to risk management disclosure. 
According to Lienbenberg and Hoyt (2003) in Kusumaningrum 
(2013), institutional ownership has a greater ability to influence corporate 
risk management policies. This is because institutional ownership requires 
more corporate information so they can make decisions about their 
investment portfolio (Solomon, 2000 in Kusumaningrum, 2013). Salo (2008) 
in Kusumaningrum (2013), asserts that institutional ownership is more 
concerned with companies with strong corporate governance practices in 
which risk management disclosures exist. 
H3 : Institutional ownership affects the disclosure of risk management. 
2.4.4 Public ownership affects the disclosure of risk management 
Company ownership by outsiders has great power in influencing companies 
through mass media in the form of criticism or comments that are all 
regarded as the voice of the community. The existence of the concentration 
of public ownership causes the influence of outsiders who can change the 
management of the company that initially went according to the desire of 
management to have limitations so that risk management disclosure can be 
more open. 
According to Prayoga (2013), the greater the share of publicly owned 
shares, the greater the pressure the company receives to provide more 
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information in its annual report. The company's management will also try to 
make good corporate image. To realize a good corporate image, companies 
must ensure that public shareholders provide positive opinions or comments 
about the company. Therefore, for the sake of a positive opinion of public 
shareholders, the company must provide transparent information, in which 
there is also a disclosure of risk management so that they know clearly what 
risks that may arise and as a guide also in decision making. 
H4 : Public ownership affects the disclosure of risk management. 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 OBJECTS AND SCOPE OF RESEARCH  
The object of the study "The Influence of Firm Size, Board Size, and 
Ownership Structure on Risk Management Disclosure" is an annual report of 
Sharia Commercial Banks in Indonesia during the period 2011-2014. 
3.2 RESEARCH METHODS 
This research uses quantitative method and using multiple linear regression 
approach. This study was conducted using secondary data obtained by 
accessing the annual report of Sharia Commercial Bank on each of the 
official websites of the Sharia Commercial Bank, which contains useful data 
for this study. Data analysis in this research is done by using SPSS 20 
program. 
3.3 POPULATION AND SAMPLE 
The population in this study is all Sharia Commercial Banks in Indonesia. 
Previous research took the population of non-Sharia Banking and Non-
Finance Companies, so this research is intended to know how the disclosure 
of risk management at Sharia Commercial Bank. Based on Sharia Banking 
Statistics data as of January 2015 the number of Sharia Commercial Banks 
are 12. The observation time of the research is from 2011 to 2014. 
Sampling in this research is done by using purposive sampling 
method. Criteria of sampling in this study are as follows: 
1. Sharia Commercial Banks registered in Bank Indonesia 2011 - 2014. 
2. Sharia Commercial Bank which publishes the annual report of 2011-
2014 in full. 
3. Sharia Banks selected have complete data related to research variables. 
According to the total existing Sharia Commercial Banks population, 
there are 10 Sharia Commercial Banks that meet all three criteria. The sample 
research is as follows:   
Tabel 1. List of Research Sample 
Numb Bank Name Website 
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1 Bank Syariah Mandiri  www.banksyariahmandiri.co.id 
2 Bank Muamalat Indonesia www.bankmuamalat.co.id 
3 BNI Syariah www.bnisyariah.co.id 
4 BRI Syariah www.brisyariah.co.id 
5 Bank Mega Syariah www.megasyariah.co.id 
6 Bank Syariah Bukopin www.syariahbukopin.co.id 
7 Bank Panin Syariah www.paninbanksyariah.co.id 
8 BCA Syariah www.bcasyariah.co.id 
9 Bank Victoria Syariah www.bankvictoriasyariah.co.id 
10 Maybank Indonesia Syariah www.maybanksyariah.co.id 
Source: Data of the authorized process of authors, 2017 
3.4 OPERATIONALIZATION OF RESEARCH VARIABLES 
3.4.1 Risk Management Disclosure  
a. Conceptual Definition 
Risk management disclosure can be interpreted as disclosure of risks that the 
company has managed or disclosure of how the company controls the 
associated risks in the future (Amran et al, 2009 in Saputro, 2014). 
b. Operational Definition 
Based on Wardhana's (2013) study, risk management disclosure is calculated 
by the formula: 
Risk Disclosure 
=   
∑ Item Risk Disclosure made by the Company
∑Total Risk Disclosure Item
 
 
A value of 1 is awarded for each item of risk disclosed by the 
company, and if not disclosure is assigned a value of 0. 
3.4.2 Firm Size 
a. Conceptual Definition 
According to Sudarmadji (2007) in Prayoga (2013), firm size can be 
expressed in total assets, sales, and market capitalization. 
b. Operational Definition 
As per research conducted by Kristiono (2014), firm size is formulated as 
follow: 
Firm Size = Log Total Asset 
3.4.3 Board Size 
a. Conceptual Definition 
According to article 1 point 6 of the Limited Liability Company Law, the 
Board of Commissioners is the organ of the company responsible for 
supervising publicly and / or specifically in accordance with the articles of 
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association and advising the directors. The board of commissioners may 
consist of one or more persons. 
b. Operational Definition 
The size of the board of commissioners is represented by the total number of 
members of the board of commissioners owned by the company, in 
accordance with Dalton et al (1999), Nasution and Setiawan (2007) and 
Abeysekera (2008) studies in Suhardjanto (2012). 
 
Board size = Number of boards of commissioners 
 
Description: Nominal scale 
3.4.4 Institutional Ownership 
a. Conceptual Definition 
According to Djakman and Machmud (2008) in Kusumaningrum (2013), 
institutional ownership is the majority shareholding of companies owned by 
institutions or other institutions (insurance companies, banks, insurance 
companies, asset management and other institutional ownership). 
b. Operational Definition 
As Kristiono's research (2014) has, institutional ownership is calculated in 
the following ways: 
INST 
=     
Number of shares of the institution
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
 
INST: Institutional ownership 
3.4.5 Public Ownership 
a. Conceptual Definition 
Public ownership according to Saputro (2014) is the ownership of shares by 
the public or by outsiders. 
b. Operational Definition 
Based on the research of Prayoga (2013), public ownership is formulated as 
follows: 
PO 
=
∑ 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 
∑𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
 
PO: Public Ownership 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
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4.1 RESULTS 
Based on the table below, it can be seen that the regression model formed 
between risk management disclosure, firm size, board size, institutional 
ownership, and public ownership are as follows: 
RMD = -2,882 + 0,295 FS – 0,050BS – 0,088 IO + 0,231PO 
Tabel 2. Multiple Linear Regression Test Results 
Source: SPSS Output 20, 2017 
a. Hypothesis Testing 1 
Based on t test presented in the table above, the firm size variable has a 
significance value of 0.000 (<0.05), besides the tcount> ttable (8.214> 
2.03011). Thus, it can be concluded that the independent variable firm size 
partially affect the disclosure of risk management and H1 which states that 
the firm size affect the risk management disclosure is accepted. 
b. Hypothesis Testing 2 
Based on the t test result presented in the table above, the board size variable 
has a significance value of 0.011 (<0.05), besides the tcount> ttable (-2,695> 
2.03011). Thus, it can be concluded that the independent variable board size 
partially affect the disclosure of risk management and H2 which states that 
the board size affect the risk management disclosure is accepted. 
c. Hypothesis Testing 3 
Based on the t test result presented in the table above, the institutional 
ownership variable has a significance value of 0.753 (> 0.05), besides the 
tcount <ttable (-0.030 <2.03011). Thus, it can be concluded that the 
independent variable of institutional ownership does not partially affect the 
disclosure of risk management and H3 which states that the institutional 
ownership affect the risk management disclosure is rejected. 
d. Hypothesis Testing 4 
Based on the t test result presented in the table above, the public ownership 
variable has a significance value of 0.003 (<0.05), besides the tcount> ttable 
(3.241> 2.03011). Thus, it can be concluded that the independent variables of 
public ownership partially affect the disclosure of risk management and H4 
which states that public ownership affect the risk management disclosure is 
accepted. 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta 
1 
(Constant) -2,882 ,515  -5,592 ,000 
FS ,295 ,036 1,092 8,214 ,000 
BS -,050 ,019 -,365 -2,695 ,011 
IO -,088 ,276 -,030 -,317 ,753 
PO ,231 ,071 ,281 3,241 ,003 
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Tabel 3. F Test Result 
Source: SPSS Output 20, 2017 
Based on F test results in the above table, it is seen that the F test 
shows a significance value of 0.000, this value is smaller than the value of α 
is 0.05 or 5%. This means that independent variables simultaneously or 
together affect the dependent variable is the risk management disclosure 
variable. Similarly, when viewed from Fcount, it appears that the 
independent variables simultaneously or together have the value Fcount> 
Ftable (25.219> 2.64). In this study, obtained Ftable value of 2.64 with 
probability 0.05. Ftable value is obtained by looking at table F, where df1 = 
number of variables-1 = 5-1 = 4 and df2 = number of observations-number of 
variables = 40-5 = 35. 
Tabel 4. Determination Coefficient Test Result 
 
From the table above, it can be seen that the adjusted R2 of 0.713. 
Thus, it can be interpreted that 71.3% of risk management disclosures are 
influenced and can be explained by independent variables in this study. 
Meanwhile, the other 28.7% is explained by other variables outside the 
regression model. Based on the results of previous research can be found 
other variables that can explain the disclosure of risk management, including 
independent commissioners, managerial ownership, leverage, and others. 
4.2 DISCUSSION 
4.2.1 Influence of Firm Size on Risk Management Disclosure 
Based on the result of t test which has been done before, it is known that 
variable of firm size has significant value equal to 0,000 <α 0,05 (5%). In 
addition, this variable has tcount> ttable (8,214> 2.03011). Thus it can be 
seen that H1 which states that the firm size has an influence on risk 
management disclosure is accepted and it can be concluded that the firm size 
affect the disclosure of risk management. 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
1 
Regression ,745 4 ,186 25,219 ,000b 
Residual ,258 35 ,007   
Total 1,004 39    
a. Dependent Variable: RMD 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FS, BS, IO, PO 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,862a ,742 ,713 ,0859394 
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The results of this study in line with the hypothesis that the total assets 
owned by the company as a proxy firm size will affect the corporate risk 
disclosure activities. In the hypothesis built, large companies can provide 
more detailed reports for internal purposes as well as meeting the needs of 
external parties. In addition, large companies may disclose risk management 
information in an effort to reduce agency costs. The results of this study also 
support the agency theory used as the basis of this study, that companies with 
larger sizes require greater monitoring costs. 
Based on a summary of the results of the calculation of variables, the 
total assets owned by Bank Bukopin Syariah and Bank Mega Syariah showed 
that company size can encourage the management of the company to try to 
perform better risk management disclosure activities. Bank Bukopin Syariah 
has total assets of Rp4,343,069,056,830 in 2013 and Rp 5,161,300,488,180 in 
2014. The total assets encourage the management of the company to attempt 
to disclose risk management, more detailed as seen from the amount of risk 
disclosed by the company has increased from the previous year. In 2013, the 
value of risk disclosure of Bank Bukopin Syariah 0.6320 increased to 0.7370 
in 2014. It can be seen that total assets owned by Bank Bukopin Syariah as a 
proxy of company size have a positive effect on corporate risk management 
disclosure activity. Large company size makes risk management disclosure 
more optimal. 
Unlike Bank Bukopin Syariah, Bank Mega Syariah has a smaller total 
assets in 2014, from Rp 9,121,575,543,000 to Rp 7,042,486,466,000. The 
decreasing total asset makes the risk disclosure value of Bank Mega Syariah 
also decrease from 0.6842 to 0,5789 in 2014. Thus, the bigger the company 
(the bigger the total asset) the better is the corporate risk management 
disclosure activity. 
The results of this study are in line with the results of research 
conducted by Wardhana (2013), Rahman (2013), and Kristiono (2014) which 
states that firm size affects risk management disclosure. However, the results 
of this study contradict the results of research conducted by Prayoga (2013) 
and Saputro (2014). 
4.2.2 Influence of Board Size on Risk Management Disclosure 
Based on the results of t-test that has been done before, it is known that the 
variable board size has a significant value of 0.011 <α 0.05 (5%). In addition, 
this variable has tcount> ttable (-2,695> 2.03011). Thus it can be seen that 
H2 which states that the board size has an influence on the disclosure of risk 
management is accepted and it can be concluded that the board size affect the 
disclosure of risk management. 
The results of this study are in line with the hypothesis that the 
number of board of commissioners owned by the company as a proxy size 
board of commissioners will affect corporate risk disclosure activities. In the 
hypothesis built, the number of boards of commissioners becomes a 
benchmark of the effectiveness of supervision in order to avoid the 
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emergence of information asymmetry, so that will encourage disclosure of 
better risk management. 
Based on the calculation of variables, the number of board of 
commissioners owned by Bank BNI Syariah and Maybank Syariah Indonesia 
shows that the size of the board of commissioners can encourage the 
management of companies to attempt to perform better risk management 
disclosure activities. Bank BNI Syariah has two commissioners in 2011 and 3 
in 2012. The lower number of boards encourages better risk management 
disclosure activities. This is seen from the amount of risk expressed by the 
company has decreased from the previous year. In 2011, the value of risk 
disclosure of Bank BNI Syariah 0.8900 decreased to 0.7630 in 2012. It can 
be seen that the number of board of commissioners owned by BNI Syariah 
Bank as the proxy of board of commissioner size has a negative effect on 
corporate risk management disclosure activity. The fewer sizes of the board 
of commissioners make the risk management disclosures more optimal. 
Unlike Bank BNI Syariah, Maybank Syariah Indonesia has fewer 
commissioners in 2012, from 3 to 2. The decreasing number of board of 
commissioners makes the Maybank Syariah Indonesia risk management 
disclosure rate increase from 0.3900 to 0.5530 in 2012. Thus, the less the 
board of commissioners (the smaller the number of boards of commissioners) 
the better the corporate risk management disclosure activities. 
The results of this study are not in line with the results of research 
conducted by Suhardjanto (2012) and Aditya (2015) which states that board 
size have a positive effect on risk management disclosure. The board size 
which negatively affects risk management disclosures can mean that an 
increasingly large number of boards leads to a decrease in the effectiveness 
of oversight, so monitoring in risk management disclosure can not work 
optimally. 
Based on Bambang's research (2012), the board size affects his ability 
to supervise the board of directors. However, the literature is not coherent 
about the direction of influence of the board size towards its effectiveness. As 
members of the board of commissioners increase, it is less likely to function 
effectively and easier for the directors to control it. This happens because of 
the difficulty of organizing and co-ordinating large groups, the board size is 
negatively related to its ability to advise and conduct long-term strategic 
planning. The conclusion is supported by the results of a group productivity 
study that shows a group to be less effective when adding to its members due 
to coordination costs and Information processing outweighs the benefits 
arising from the diversity of expertise gained. 
4.2.3 Influence of Institutional Ownership on Risk Management Disclosure 
Based on the result of t test that has been done before, it is known that 
institutional ownership variable has significant value equal to 0,753> α 0,05 
(5%). In addition, this variable has tcount <ttabel (-0.317 <2.03011). Thus it 
can be seen that H3 which states that institutional ownership has an influence 
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on disclosure of risk management is rejected and it can be concluded that 
institutional ownership has no effect on risk management disclosure. 
The results of this study are not in line with the hypothesis built. In the 
hypothesis, the ownership of the institute that encourages corporate oversight 
measures will reduce opportunistic or self-serving behavior, so management 
will maximize its performance, including in terms of risk management 
disclosure. 
The inadequacy of institutional ownership of risk management 
disclosure can be seen from the results of the calculation of variables, most of 
the value of institutional ownership owned by the research sample shows the 
same amount. Bank BNI Syariah, Bank Syariah Mandiri, Bank BRI Syariah, 
Bank Mega Syariah, Bank BCA Syariah and Maybank Syariah Indonesia in 
2011-2014 and Panin Syariah Bank in 2011-2013 have an institutional 
ownership value of 1.0000. This suggests that perhaps the ownership of 
shares by the institution is not to encourage risk management disclosure. 
Thus, the ownership of shares owned by an institution within a company may 
tend to provide information to stakeholders that the shares in the company are 
dominated by the institution. 
Meanwhile, some Sharia Commercial Banks have large institutional 
ownership because institutional ownership has the advantage of having 
professionalism in analyzing information so as to test the reliability of 
information and have strong motivation to carry out stricter supervision on 
activities that occur within the company. 
However, based on the results of this study some institutions that have 
shares in Sharia Commercial Banks do not supervise the companies they 
invest. They should be more active and concerned with the risks expressed by 
the company, because with the disclosure of risk, the company is actually 
giving a signal to investors and other stakeholders that the company is 
concerned with transparency and able to manage risk management. 
The results of this study are consistent with the results of research 
conducted by Kristiono (2014) which states that institutional ownership has 
no effect on risk management disclosure. However, the results of this study 
are inconsistent with the results of Kusumaningrum (2013) and Aditya (2015) 
studies which state that institutional ownership has an effect on risk 
management disclosure. 
4.2.4 Influence of Public Ownership on Risk Management Disclosures 
Based on the result of t test that has been done before, it is known that public 
ownership variable has significant value equal to 0,003 <α 0,05 (5%). In 
addition, this variable has tcount> ttable (3,241> 2.03011). Thus it can be 
seen that H4 which states that public ownership has an influence on risk 
management disclosure is accepted and it can be concluded that public 
ownership affects the disclosure of risk management. 
The results of this study are in line with the hypothesis built that the 
number of shares owned by public will affect the corporate risk disclosure 
activities. In the hypothesis that built, the existence of concentration of public 
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ownership to influence the outsiders who can change the management of 
companies that initially run according to the desire of management to have 
limitations so that risk management disclosure can be more open. 
Based on the results of the calculation of variables, the total 
shareholding of Bank Panin Syariah and Maybank Syariah Indonesia shows 
that public ownership can encourage the management of the company to try 
to conduct better risk management disclosure activities. The total shares of 
Bank Panin Syariah held publicly 0.1793 in 2013 and 0.2318 in 2014. The 
large institutional ownership encourages the management of the company to 
attempt to disclose risk management more detailed, as seen from the amount 
of risk disclosed by the company experiencing increase from the previous 
year. In 2013, Bank Panin Syariah risk management disclosure value of 
0.6050 increased to 0.6580 in 2014. It can be seen that Bank Panin Syariah's 
public ownership positively influences on corporate risk management 
disclosure activities. The greater amount of public ownership makes risk 
disclosure more optimal. 
Unlike Bank Panin Syariah, Maybank Syariah Indonesia has a smaller 
public ownership in 2014, from 0.4144 to 0.0000. Decreased public 
ownership makes the value of risk disclosure Maybank Syariah Indonesia 
also decreased from 0.5300 to 0.4200 in 2014. Thus, the greater the public 
ownership the better the corporate risk management disclosure activities. 
Meanwhile, the trend of public ownership in sharia banking is quite 
varied. Based on a summary of the results of the calculation of research 
variables, public ownership of Bank BNI Syariah, Bank Syariah Mandiri, 
Bank BRI Syariah, Bank Mega Syariah, and Bank BCA Syariah tend to 
static. In addition, the fluctuating trend of public ownership is owned by 
Bank Muamalat Indonesia, Bank Bukopin Syariah, and Maybank Syariah 
Indonesia. While Bank Panin Syariah and Bank Victoria Syariah, public 
ownership tend to rise. 
The results of this study are in line with the results of research 
conducted by Prayoga (2013) and Saputro (2014) stating that public 
ownership affects the disclosure of risk management.   
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This study aims to examine the effect of firm size, board size, institutional 
ownership, and public ownership on risk management disclosure. The 
research period was conducted for four years, which are 2011-2014 with 
sample of Sharia Commercial Bank in Indonesia. This study uses secondary 
data and obtained a sample of 10 Sharia Commercial Banks that have met the 
purposive sampling criteria established by researchers. Based on testing and 
analysis that has been done in this research, the conclusion that can be taken 
are as follows: 
1. Firm size has a positive effect on risk management disclosure. The size 
of the company can encourage better risk management disclosure activities. 
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2. The board size has a negatively affects on the disclosure of risk 
management. The smaller board size allows for more effective monitoring so 
that risk management disclosures are more optimal. 
3. Institutional ownership has no effect on risk management disclosure. The 
amount of institutional ownership tends to provide information that the 
ownership of shares in an enterprise is dominated by the institution, not to 
optimize the risk management disclosure activity. 
4. Public ownership has a positive effect on risk management disclosure. 
The concentration of public ownership leads to the influence of outsiders 
who can change the management of the company that initially went 
according to the wishes of management to have limitations so that risk 
management disclosure can be more open.  
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